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Academic freedom is a concept that has a particular significance in a 
University, not least in a University, which, uniquely in a British context, 
prides itself on its independence from the State. 
My interest in academic freedom was sparked by a set of instructions 
received in this instance from the Government of Hong Kong.  The issue in 
the prospective litigation was relatively simple.  The Department of Education 
had planned some reforms.  As is no more unusual in Hong Kong than it is in 
England, the proposals met with vocal opposition from certain academics.  A 
senior civil servant telephoned the head of the faculty of the Hong Kong 
institution of Education, the focus of the controversy and – it was asserted and 
indeed found by a Commission of Inquiry (“the Commission”) established to 
investigate the affair – suggested that the turbulent teachers be disciplined.   
No one disputed that this was an attempted interference with academic 
freedom.  For a government to seek to impose sanctions on academics for 
expressing their views on educational matters would be a paradigm example 
of such interference; but the question on which I was asked to advise and in 
relation to which I ultimately represented the Department was more nuanced.  
For the civil servant had also confronted her academic critics directly, making 
no threats, but expressing her disagreement with their views in a manner as 
trenchant as that in which their views had themselves been expressed.  Was 
this too another example of interference with academic freedom? 
On the one hand it was argued – an argument upheld by the Commission – 
that it was.  Even if the civil servant made no actual threat, statements from a 
person of such status carried with it the possibility of sanction.  On the other 
hand, it was argued that the civil servant was doing no more than exercising 
her own freedom of expression. 
In the end I persuaded the Administrative Court in Hong Kong that the 
Civil Servant was indeed acting within her own rights and that the 
Commission’s criticism was to that extent unwarranted.1  But my preparation 
                                                     
* The Hon Michael J Beloff, Blackstone Chambers, MA (Oxon), Hon LLD (DMU). 
1 Secretary for Justice v Commission of Inquiry on allegation relating to the Hong Kong 
Institute of Education [2009] HKC 102 (“HKIE case”).  
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for the litigation showed me how elusive is the notion of academic freedom 
and how little considered by the courts – at any rate in this country.2 
Google – that modern short cut to – or, some would say – substitute for 
research, revealed no English law book devoted exclusively to the subject.  It 
is found neither in the text nor in footnotes of Education and The Courts.3 
Professor Eric Barendt’s “Freedom of Speech”4 gives it a mere 2 pages out of 
a total of 526 and locates it in a chapter called “Free Speech in Special 
Contexts”.  However he informs me that he will shortly fill the lacuna in 
English commentary by a book devoted entirely to the topic.  I can aspire in 
this lecture to provide a footnote for that much anticipated work.5 
I can, however, only speculate as to where Professor Barendt will find the 
relevant material for I can trace only one English statutory provision which 
makes a specific reference to academic freedom. 
The Education Reform Act 1988 (“ERA”) established a body of 
University Commissioners, whose main duties under Section 203 were to 
secure that the statutes of any institution within their remit included provision 
for dismissal of staff for redundancy or good cause - not, you may think, the 
most auspicious point of departure for protection of academic freedom, since 
it involved the abolition of tenure, colloquially, jobs for life for academics, 
long regarded as a sine qua non for those who taught in college or on campus.  
However the regime was softened by the provision of Section 202(2), that in 
the exercise of such function.  
 
“…the Commissioners shall have regard to the need to (a) ensure that 
academic staff have freedom within the law to question and test 
received opinion, and to put forward new ideas and controversial or 
unpopular opinions, without placing themselves in jeopardy of losing 
their jobs or privileges they may have at their institutions.” 
 
                                                     
2 The Commission cited: (1) The First Global Colloquium of University Presidents 
(Columbia University, January 18-19th, 2005): Report §14.3 (pp 91-92). (2) 
University of Delaware Faculty Handbook (Section 4, Personnel Policies for Faculty, 
B Academic Freedom and Standards of Code): Report §14.7 (p 93). 
3 J R McManus QC Education and the Courts (Bristol: Jordans, 2nd edn, 2004).  
4 E Barendt Freedom of Speech (New York: Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 2007).  
5 In the United States, unsurprisingly the literature, at any rate periodical, is more 
lavish, but not necessarily more enlightening. See eg: Hofstadter and Metzger The 
Development of Academic Freedom in the United States (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1955); T Haskell “Justifying the Right of Academic Freedom in the 
Era of ‘Powers/Knowledge’” in L Menand (ed) The Future of Academic Freedom 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976); J Peter Byrne “Academic Freedom A 
Special Concern of the First Amendment” 99 Yale Law Journal 251. 
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The terms of that paragraph derived from a speech made by the Secretary 
of State for Education and Science in October 1987.  Their inclusion in the 
Act, by amendment in Committee in the House of Lords, was at first resisted 
by Lord Hailsham, the then Lord Chancellor, who suggested that they added 
nothing to the provision that the Commissioners had also to have regard to the 
need to apply (b) “the principle of justice and fairness”.  Whether the sub 
paragraph (a) was in truth redundant because of sub-paragraph (b) has never 
been put to proof since neither provision appears to have been subjected to 
judicial scrutiny. The section from ERA, does, however, reflect the 
conventional understanding of the concept. 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines academic freedom as:  
 
“The right (esp. of a university teacher) to speak freely about political 
or ideological issues without fear of loss of position or other reprisal.”6   
 
CAFAS, the Council for Academic Freedom and Academic Standards, in 
their website suggest Academic Freedom “is increasingly under attack, 
particularly when staff expose instances of competition and shoddy standards” 
but how many, if any, academics have actually lost either job or privileges 
because of their nature of their opinions is not evidenced.7 
In R v Hull University ex p Page8 the substantive issue was whether the 
academic’s standard letter of appointment stipulating for termination of three 
months notice was trumped by the University statutes which required 
dismissal only for “good cause” – argued to be crucial to secure the principle 
of academic freedom.9  I persuaded the House of Lords that the provisions of 
contract and statute could enjoy a peaceful co-existence and that the 
University could lawfully dispense with the services of Mr Page, a 
philosopher who seemed, in dress and demeanour, to have sprung straight 
from the pages of a campus novel about the sixties by Kingsley Amis,10 
Malcolm Bradbury11 or David Lodge.12 He had not himself expressed 
controversial views on political or ideological issues, indeed the University’s 
concern was rather that he had expressed few views of any kind, and that 
(putting such personal matters to one side) the compulsory maintenance in 
                                                     
6 Black's Law Dictionary (St. Paul: West Thomson, 9th edn, 2009). 
7 Tenure is key to the protection of the principle of academic freedom. In Keefe v 
Geanakos: 418 F 20 359 the US Court of Appeals said pithily “Academic Freedom is 
not preserved by compulsory retirement even on free pay”. 
8 [1993] AC 682. 
9 Ibid, at 691 G-H. 
10 Lucky Jim (New York: Penguin, 1954). 
11 The History Man (London: Picador, 1975).  
12 Changing Places (Secker & Warburg, 1975). 
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office of senior academics, appointed in an era of university expansion, when 
(unlike today) posts were more plentiful, and applicants fewer, constituted a 
barrier against the recruitment of livelier younger minds. 
In McKinney v University of Guelph13 (“McKinney”) in which the 
Supreme Court of Canada held that a mandatory retirement age of 65 for the 
teaching of staff did not violate constitutional right to non-discrimination 
since universities were private bodies, La Forest LJ made the same point 
succinctly: 
 
“Tenure provides the necessary academic freedom to allow free and 
fearless search for knowledge and the propagation of ideas.”14 
 
adding 
 
“Mandatory retirement not only supports the tenure system which 
underpins the specific and necessary ambience of university life.  It 
ensures continuity faculty renewal, a necessary process to enable 
universities to be centres of excellence.  Universities need to be at the 
cutting edge of new discoveries and ideas, and this requires a 
continuing infusion of new people.  In a closed system with limited 
resources this can only be achieved by departures of other people.”15 
 
But he also recognised that threats to academic freedom could be the 
product of forces external rather than internal to the University. 
 
“The legal autonomy of the universities is fully buttressed by their 
traditional position in society.  Any attempt by Government to 
influence university decisions especially decisions regarding 
appointment, tenure and dismissal of academic staff, would be 
strenuously resisted by the universities on the basis that this could lead 
to breaches of academic freedom.”16 
 
In Clark v University of Melbourne17 Kaye J spoke of the traditional 
meaning of academic freedom as being the “unimpeded freedom to teach, to 
study, and to research without any external control either of the teaching staff 
or the curriculum of the tertiary institution.” This dictum also demonstrates a 
                                                     
13 [1990] 3 SCR 229. 
14 Ibid, at 282. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid, at 273.   
17 [1978] VR 457.  
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further strand in the fabric of the concept: freedom as to what is taught as well 
as to who teaches it. 
Although as Professor Barendt has rightly said: “Academic freedom... 
may not be confined to higher education, but clearly has more resonance in 
that context than it does in schools,”18 the most celebrated legal case involving 
academic freedom was one of the many Trials of the Century19 involved what 
we would call a secondary school.  It turned on the Butler Act of Tennessee 
that prohibited the teaching in any university or school supported by public 
funds “of any theory that denies the story of divine creation of man as taught 
in the Bible, and to teach instead that man has descended from a lower order 
of animals.” The penalty was a fine of $500.   
In 1925 John Scope, the local high school’s science teacher (and part time 
football coach), fell foul of this law by teaching evolution as Darwin 
conceived it.  The prosecution instructed William Jennings Bryan, three times 
unsuccessful Democratic Presidential candidate, the defence Clarence 
Darrow, a jury advocate of remarkable gifts.  Darrow actually lost the case in 
the Rhea County Court in Dayton because the Judge ruled inadmissible his 
further cross-examination of Prosecuting counsel – a bizarre procedural step 
which would only occur this side of the Atlantic in a novel by Jeffrey 
Archer.20 Darrow impaled Bryan by competing him to defend the literal truth 
of the book of Genesis.  The moral victory was his; and he won on a technical 
point in the Tennessee Supreme Court.21   
But academic freedom can extend beyond the right of a school or 
university to decide who can teach, and what can be taught. 
Sweezy v New Hampshire22 (“Sweezy”) was the first case in which the 
Justices of the Supreme Court discussed academic freedom.  Frankfurter J 
(who was joined by Harlan J) observed that the “four essential freedoms” of a 
university are to determine “who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall 
be taught, and who may be admitted to study.”23 
Let me then turn for what may be taught to how it should be taught.  In 
Merdeka University Berhad24 the Federal Court of Malaysia upheld by a 
majority of 4-1 the refusal of the Government of a petition to establish a 
                                                     
18 Barendt, above n 4, p 500.   
19 D McRae The Old Devil: Clarence Darrow: The World’s Greatest Trial Lawyer 
(London: Simon & Schuster, 2009). 
20 See, for example, J Archer A Prisoner of Birth (New York: Macmillan, 2008), 
where a former Judge became an advocate in an English Court.  
21 152 Tenn 424 278 S.W. 57 (Tenn 1926).  
22 354 US 234 (1957).  
23 Ibid, at 263. 
24 (1982) 2 Malayan Law Journal 243; see M J Beloff QC “Minority Languages and 
the Law” (1987) 40 Current Legal Problems 139.  
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university where the language of tuition would be Chinese on the ground that 
the use of Chinese as the medium of instruction would be “for an official 
purpose” and so prohibited under Article 152(1)(a) of the Constitution, which 
enshrined Bahasa as the national language.  The majority were all ethnic 
Malays: the dissentient an ethnic Chinese.  Malaysia had recently severed its 
ties in matters constitutional with the Privy Council so these grave matters 
were never put to proof in a forum divorced from the racial tension which 
then – but far less so now – afflicted that beautiful country.  Representing, as I 
did, the petitioners, I regretted that lost opportunity.25 
The Chinese language suffered another more recent blow in Hong Kong.  
The Chinese University of Hong Kong was established in 1963.  It was clearly 
intended to complement the University of Hong Kong which had been in 
existence since 1912 and in which the principal language of instruction was 
English.  The Preamble of the Ordinance under which it was created26 stated: 
“whereas it is desirable to establish a University with a Federal Constitution in 
which the principal language of instruction shall be Chinese”. Times changed: 
and the University thought it should change with them.  It was felt that unless 
English were to replace Chinese as the principal language of tuition its 
attraction to overseas students and teachers and its access to globalised 
scholarship would be diminished.  The question was whether the University 
could lawfully make this switch. 
Section 8 of a later Ordinance,27 (“the 1976 Ordinance) currently in force, 
provided (so far as material) that: 
 
“Subject to this Ordinance and the Statutes and subject also to review 
by the Council, the Senate shall have control and regulation of: 
(a) instruction, teaching and resources” 
 
In Statute 14 of the Statutes of the University made pursuant to Section 13 
of the same Ordinance, paragraph 4 provides  
 
“Subject to the Ordinance and Statutes, the Senate shall have the 
following powers and duties: 
…………………………. 
(c) to direct and regulate the instruction and teaching in approved 
courses of study ……………… 
                                                     
25 Lord Bingham of Cornhill (as he now is) suggested to me informally that had the 
matter gone to the Privy Council my clients, the Chinese secondary schools 
association, would have won. 
26 Chinese University of Hong Kong Ordinance Cap (1969) 1109 (“CUHKO”). The 
case itself is Li Yin Kee v CUHK HCAL 5/200 (on appeal). 
27 Chinese University of Hong Kong Ordinance Chapter (1976) 1109.  
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
 
 
123 
 
 
In short nothing impeded the Senate in determining the language of 
instruction in the University, unless the Ordinance otherwise provided. 
The potential source of the impediment to the proposed change of 
direction lay in the Preamble to the 1976 Ordinance which provides: 
 
“WHEREAS 
(c)“it is declared that the Chinese University of Hong Kong in which 
the principal language of instruction shall be Chinese shall continue 
to: 
(i) assist in the preservation, dissemination, communication and 
increase in knowledge; 
(ii) Provide regular courses of instruction in the humanities, the 
sciences and other branches of   learning of a standard required 
and expected of a University of the highest standing; 
(iii) Stimulate the intellectual and cultural development of Hong 
Kong and thereby to assist in promoting its economic and social 
welfare.”   
 
The Hong Kong Administrative Court held that this preamble could not be 
used to fossilise the way in which teaching was delivered.  It held “that the 
relevant part of the Preamble should be interpreted in the historical context” 
that is to say had outlived its usefulness. 
Although I have doubts about the legal soundness of the decision – and 
had so advised the unsuccessful claimant - it can at least be seen to be a 
victory for academic freedom.  Infringement of University’s autonomy might 
have taken place if the Hong Kong Government had sought itself to compel 
the University to adapt another language as the principal language of 
instruction against the will of the University bodies (Senate and Council) who 
wished to retain it.  But that was not this case.  The solution, which would 
have been legally impeccable, would have been to amend the preamble.  But 
one may readily appreciate why, given Hong Kong’s particular status as an 
SAR within the PRC, the obvious course was not taken.  It would not be 
consonant with the PRC’s self-esteem for the Hong Kong legislative council 
to enact a measure that would suggest that English was superior to Mandarin. 
The Court in reaching its decision did not itself evaluate the respective 
merits of tuition in English or tuition in Chinese.  It is well-established that 
the Courts cannot review purely academic decisions, for example as to the 
grading of an institution28 or even, for that matter of a student.  An American 
academic has said: 
                                                     
28 Institute for Dental Surgery v HEFCE [1994] 1 WLR 292 (“IDS”).  
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“The justification for defence is that courts are not well-equipped to 
second-guess the exercise of the professional scholarly standards that 
advance the constitutional value of democratic competence.  Courts 
are properly concerned that judges should not be ersatz deans and 
educators”.29  
 
Or as Sedley J said: 
 
 “There is (no) sufficient basis upon which this Court can hold the 
eventual rating to be so aberrant as to call for explanation.  We lack 
precisely the expertise which would permit us to judge whether it is 
extraordinary or not.”30  
 
This judicial self-restraint is itself paradoxically a guarantee of academic 
freedom for Courts, no less than the Executive, should render under 
universities things that are properly universities. Academic freedom is 
institutional as well as personal. 
The dictum of Frankfurter J about the four essential freedoms in Sweezy,31 
which I have already cited, adopted a statement of principle made by 
academics of certain South African universities, who identified those 
freedoms as indeed pertaining to the university, not to the members of its 
academic community.32 The same statement of principle referred to the 
business of university as being – 
 
“...to provide that atmosphere which is most conductive to 
speculation, experiment and creation.”33 
 
because: 
 
“A university ceases to be true to its own nature if it becomes the tool 
of Church or State or any sectional interest. A university is 
characterized by the spirit of free inquiry, its ideal being the ideal of 
Socrates – ‘to follow the argument where it leads’. This implies the 
right to examine, question, modify or reject traditional ideas and 
                                                     
29 Robert Post “Academic Freedom and the Production of Knowledge”: Julian 
Rosenthal Foundation Lecture North Western University School of Law p 22. 
30 Above n 28, at 261. 
31 Above n 22.  
32 Statement of a conference of Senior Scholars from the University of Cape Town 
and the University of Witwatersrand. 
33 Cited by Frankfurter J at 354 US 234 (1957). 
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beliefs. Dogma and hypothesis are incompatible, and the concept of an 
immutable doctrine is repugnant to the spirit of a university.”34   
 
A like attachment of the concept to institution, not individual, is found too 
in the Basic Law of Hong Kong.  The key phrase appears in Chapter VI 
(which bears the heading: Education, Science, Culture, Sports, Religion, 
Labour and Social Services). Article 137 provides that – 
 
“Educational institutions of all kinds may retain their autonomy and 
enjoy academic freedom...” 
 
In the Catholic Diocese of Hong Kong v Secretary of State for Justice35 
the Administrative Court emphasised the importance of such autonomy citing 
the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
General Comments No 13 of 1999, dealing with the right to education under 
article 13 of ICESCR ”  to which I shall return. It noted: 
 
“As the General Comments No 13 pointed out, autonomy must be 
consistent with systems of public accountability, especially in respect 
of funding provided by the State and an appropriate balance has to be 
struck between institutional autonomy and accountability.36  
 
and 
 
Aided schools are heavily funded by the Government of the Hong 
Kong SAR.  The privilege of autonomy carried with it the requirement 
of accountability.  That must mean that the government, which 
provides huge funding to aided schools, has a right to regulate the 
management of aided schools for the purpose of accountability.  
Autonomy cannot therefore be an absolute right.”37 
 
and 
 
That has always been the case prior to July 1997 given that aided 
schools were under the control of the Education Ordinance and the 
applicable codes of aid.  The government and the Legislature have 
always possessed the right to enforce changes regarding the 
                                                     
34 Cited by Frankfurter J ibid, at 263 
35 [2007] 4 HKLRD 483.  
36 Ibid, at para [246].  
37 Ibid, at para [247].  
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management of aided schools.  Article 137(1) only guarantees the 
right to ‘retain’ institutional autonomy.  .... It does not confer a new or 
improved right of autonomy on educational institutions.  It does not 
require a greater degree of independency to be conferred upon 
them.”38 
 
This analysis reflected economic reality, not political bias. Much the same had 
been said by Le Forest CJ in McKinney: 
 
“[t]he universities’ fate is largely in the hands of the government and 
... universities are subjected to important limitations on what they can 
do, either by regulation or because of their dependence on government 
funds.”39 
 
A different reality is reflected in the relationship between university and 
staff.  It is the very freedom of the University that has, in the USA, been 
widely deployed to restrict an individual academic’s rights in respect of 
freedom of grading and curriculum content.40 I recall that, when a visiting 
professor in International Sports Law at the University of Tulane in New 
Orleans – my course lasted a bare fortnight! – I found out that I was obliged to 
allocate so many students to a particular grade, irrespective of my view as to 
their actual merit, and that this was not unusual on an American campus.   
In Edwards v California University of Pennsylvania41 the Court held:  
 
“[The] First Amendment does not allow a university professor to 
decide what is taught in the classroom, but rather protects the 
university’s right to select the curriculum.” 
 
Professor Barendt has noted that:   
                                                     
38 Ibid, at para [248].  Article 136 of the Basic Law permits and enables the 
government of Hong Kong to formulate policies on the development and 
improvement of education, “including the language of instruction”.    
39 Above n 13, at 272.  
40 See for example Urofsky v Gilmore 216 F 30, 401, 414 (4th Circuit 2000), Wozniak 
v Comy 236 F 3888, 891 (7th Circuit 2001), Brown v Armenti (274 F 30, 69 (3rd 
Circuit 2001).   
41 156, F 30 488, 491 (3rd Circuit 1998).  In Parducci v Rutland USDC for the Middle 
District of Alabama Northern Division 316 F Supp 352 the Plaintiff’s teacher 
obtained reinstatement after she had been dismissed for assigning a short story by 
Kurt Vonnegut which the Principal had described as “literary garbage”.  The Court 
held that: “However wide the discretion of school officials, such discretion cannot be 
exercised so as to deprive teachers of their First Amendment rights” (Another 
exception is Parate v Isibor 868 F 23, 821, 827-828 (6th Circuit 1989)). 
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
 
 
127 
 
“…a teacher has no right to decide what subject he teaches in a 
particular class.  He is employed to teach, say mathematics or French, 
and the syllabus subjects are prescribed.” 42  
 
It follows that someone employed to lecture in law cannot consistently 
with his contractual obligations, teach languages (even were he competent 
to do so).  
This is not to say that freedom in research and teaching (subject 
always to funding and terms of engagement), is not a derivative of 
institutional autonomy, Commentators on the South African Constitution 
have written: 
 
“while the constitutional protection of academic freedom may come 
down in favour of the institution in conflict with academics 
concerning certain curricular and grading issues ... a general principle 
that academic freedom is exclusively that of institutions and not of 
individual academics cannot hold under our constitution.”43 
 
So while academic freedom may be a chameleon concept it is at least 
clear that it does not enable either academic institutions or individuals to do so 
whatever they choose in performance of academic functions or in pursuit of 
academic goals.  It is not a trump card which overrides all others.  Both 
institution and individual are subject to the constraints of the law and of 
resources. 
Charles Clarke MP, when Secretary of State for Education, spoke 
dismissively of the value of classical and medieval studies.  The issue, 
however, as framed by him was as to whether the State should fund such 
studies, directly by supporting the institutions where it was taught, or 
indirectly by supporting the students who receive the tuition.  He did not 
suggest that the teaching of classical studies should be banned.44 
Yet the call to purge the content of universities courses is not unknown 
even in the democratic world.  Sandra Day O’Connor,45 former Supreme 
Court Justice and Chancellor of the University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hall, recalls that, in her cancellarial, not judicial role, she had to defend the 
University and its faculty from fierce attacks from the political right over the 
choice of books chosen for the first year reading assignment, including (in the 
                                                     
42 Above n 4, at 496 (for US and Canadian cases).  See ditto at 498-499. 
43 Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (South Africa: JUTA Law, 2nd 
edn, 2002) pp 42-61. 
44 See his letter to The Guardian of May 10th 2003. 
45 “Unchallenged Orthodoxies” speech delivered at a conference in Austin, Texas in 
2008.  
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wake of 9/11) one about the Koran (said to be unconstitutional as breaching 
the separation of church and state) and another about the life of a low paid 
worker in the USA, (said to be an attempt to indoctrinate socialism). 
We naturally and instinctively rebel against the notion that constraints, 
other than legal or financial, can be imposed on study and research, but even 
here the picture is not painted in black and white, but in shades of grey. 
Take the corollary of the Scopes trial.  Should students be able to consider 
the case in favour of intelligent design, or should it be banned from the 
academic agenda, as Richard Dawkins, the distinguished scientist and militant 
atheist, suggests?46 Should it be permissible to inquire into whether certain 
forms of intelligence is unevenly distributed between different ethnic groups, 
the thesis of the late Hans Eysenck,47 or classes, the proposition espoused by 
Charles Murray48 or whether women are intrinsically less gifted than men in 
the exact sciences, the speculation of the former President of Harvard, Larry 
Summers, now restored to the inner economic councils of a Democratic 
President?49  Much of the contemporary debate over university admissions 
has, as its premise, that substantial numbers of potential students lose out in 
the battle for scare places to innately less gifted competitors, who enjoy 
advantages of superior schooling and more advantageous backgrounds; but 
how large the numbers are is a matter for speculation, not statistics.   
My own view is that, as articulated by the great US judge and jurist, 
Oliver Wendell Holmes echoing John Stuart Mill, and adopted by Lord 
Steyn.50 
 
“The best test of truth is the power of thought to get itself accepted in 
the competition of the market place.”51 
 
Accurate information should inform political judgment – although it need 
not necessarily constrain it.  Alan Johnson MP the then Home Secretary, 
sacked Professor David Nott as Chairman of the Advisory Council on the 
Misuse of Drugs for saying in a lecture that cannabis was less dangerous than 
                                                     
46The Guardian September 1st 2005.  In September 2008 the Royal Society, Education 
Director, Professor Michael Reiss, was compelled to resign for advocating the 
teaching of creationism alongside evolution in school science classes. 
47 H Eysenck Race Intelligence and Education (London: Temple Smith, 1971). 
48 C Murray and R J Herrnstein The Bell Curve (New York: Free Press, 1994).  
49 “Summers Remarks on Women Draw Fire” The Boston Globe January 17th 2005.  
50 Simms v Secretary of State for Home Department  [2000] 2 AC 115 at 126.  
51 So too Lord Nicholls observed in Reynolds v Times Newspaper, “the high 
importance of freedom to impart and receive information and ideas has been stated so 
often and so eloquently that this point calls for no elaboration” [2001] 2 AC 127 at 
200.  
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alcohol.  No doubt the Minister could justify his own claim that even were 
that so, it did not inexorably compel the legalisation of cannabis.52 
More insidiously the tilt towards sponsorship of research by corporate 
bodies risks impairing academic freedom, not positively by prohibiting forms 
of research but negatively by channelling them into areas of profit for 
sponsors pharmaceutical oil companies.  It has been calculated that 70% of 
published articles in the biosciences had in part been written by corporate 
PPs.53 
But the law itself sets limit to free speech in a variety of ways and for a 
variety of reasons: which apply as much as to what is said inside as outside a 
university. For example, holocaust denial is a criminal offence not only in 
Israel but in many European countries: and no one could shelter behind the 
shield of academic freedom if he used the lecture theatre to preach racial 
incitement, or to defame his political colleagues, although more controversial 
were the libel proceedings brought by the British Chiropractors Association 
against Simon Singh for casting doubt on efficacy of their treatment described 
by him as “bogus”.  The case raised issues as to the dimensions of the defence 
of fair comment,54 fortunately resolved in favour of Mr Singh in judgment of 
the Court of Appeal, adopting a dictum from an American case “Scientific 
controversies must be settled by the methods of science rather than by the 
methods of litigation." 
Now in this tour d’horizon I stress that the law on academic freedom 
touches on the issue allusively rather than directly.   Academic freedom is not 
found as a discrete right in the US Constitution’s First Amendment,55 the New 
                                                     
52 Lord Rees of Ludlow “Scientific Advice Must be Respected Even When Rejected” 
The Times November 5th 2009. 
53 Jonathan Hari “Peter Mandelson’s Assault on Science” The Independent November 
17th 2009. 
54 [2010] EWCA Civ 350. See also “BCA v Singh: The Story So Far: Sense About 
Science” Sunday Times June 3rd 2009.  Peter Wilmshurst, a consultant cardiologist at 
Royal Shrewsbury Hospital is being sued by NMT for casting doubt on the efficacy of 
their device Startfax as a cure for migraine; The Times, November 26th 2009, p 22.  
See too on the case brought by Mr Thomason a Danish radiologist warning about 
risks of one of its drugs.  “Drug giant uses libel law to gag doctors” Sunday Times 
December 20th 2009.  Alternative therapists and makers of medical devices are using 
the UK courts to silence critics and libel laws stifle health doubts.  Sunday Times: 
November 1st 2009 which suggested that “Scientists and Specialists who question 
medical treatments and alternative therapies are being gagged by firms using Britain’s 
draconian libel laws”.   
55 The Constitution of the United States makes no mention of “academic freedom”.  
However, free speech is guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution (“First Amendment”), which reads:“Freedom of Religion, Press, 
Expression: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
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Zealand Bill of Rights the European Convention on Human Rights, the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Malaysian Constitution, the 
Indian Constitution, the Israeli Basic Law: Human Rights and Dignity, or the 
law of Australia which is entirely devoid of a bill or charter of rights.   
Indeed in the USA academic freedom is given no special status. In 
Keyishian v Board of Regents56 Brennan J (speaking on behalf of the Supreme 
Court) held that teachers and professors had the same free speech and political 
privacy rights afforded to other citizens, stating that academic freedom “… is 
a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that 
cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.”57 
The Court of Appeal (10th circuit) re-affirmed Keyishian by refusing to 
construe the First Amendment as giving professors a “special constitutional 
right of academic freedom not enjoyed by other governmental employees.”58 
Academic freedom does not exist on its own in a vacuum, but is therefore 
a sub-set of the individual academic’s right to free speech under the First 
Amendment. Accordingly, those who claim violations of their right to 
“academic freedom” under the First Amendment have to pass all of the tests 
that would entitle them to relief in First Amendment actions.59  
The general procedure in relation to this is as follows.  The Plaintiff first 
has to establish that the speech in question is within the scope of expression 
protected by First Amendment - this is because the First Amendment does not 
protect certain categories of speech, including defamation, incitement, the 
lewd and obscene, and pornography produced with real children.60 The 
Plaintiff then has to establish that (s)he has standing to sue under the First 
Amendment.  The Plaintiff does not need to prove that governmental action 
(which may not be statutory) has had a direct effect on the exercise of First 
Amendment rights.   However it must have caused or must threaten to cause a 
direct injury to the Plaintiffs’ interests.   
The injury alleged is usually a “chilling effect” on the individual’s right to 
free speech under the First Amendment. The mere knowledge and fear that 
the government might take in the future some other action detrimental to that 
                                                                                                                               
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances.” 
56 385 US 589 (Supreme Court, 1967). 
57 Ibid, at 603. 
58 Robert W Schrier v University of Colorado (2005) 427 F 3d 1253 (10th Circuit, 
(2005).  
59 Oladele Oladotun Omosegbon v Richard H. Wells (2003) 335 F 3d 668 (7th Circuit, 
2003).  
60 Ashcroft v Free Speech Coalition 535 US 234 (Supreme Court, 2002) at 245-246 
per Kennedy J delivering the opinion of the Court.  This was touched on also in 
Report 14.1. 
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individual will not suffice.  Furthermore, allegations of a “subjective chill” 
“are not an adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm 
or a threat of specific future harm”.61 
Evidence of a “cognisable injury” will, however, be accepted to establish 
standing, such as the risk that an exercise of the Plaintiff’s freedom under the 
First Amendment would be detrimental to his or her reputation.62  Reprimands 
for statements by an employee which may be “construed to convey the 
message that like comments in the future would put the [the employee] in 
danger of discharge” was held to be of “constitutional significance.”63   
The Plaintiff must then show that the injury must be “fairly traceable” to 
the Defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and that it is “likely to be 
addressed” by the requested relief.64  If however the “chill” has passed, for 
example where it is based on a regime no longer in existence, the Court may 
be reluctant to grant nominal damages on which to hang a declaration, as the 
latter remedy would only have effect as to future dealings between the 
parties.65 
Once standing has been established, it is a separate question as to whether 
the action has in fact violated the First Amendment:66 A threat would clearly 
be sufficient to suggest such violation.   
In Trotman v Board of Trustees of Lincoln University of the 
Commonwealth System of High Education.67 The Plaintiffs (former and 
current faculty members of a state university) sought, inter alia, judicial 
censure of a course of conduct that they considered to have violated their 
constitutional right to engage in spirited criticism of administrative policies 
with which they disagreed.68  The Court of Appeal of the 3rd Circuit found that 
certain letters and telegrams threatening disciplinary action against the 
plaintiffs, which the District Court at first instance had prevented them from 
adducing: 
 
“...would have been relevant to their claim of specific present 
objective harm, and hence presents a far different claim than.... 
‘generalised allegations of chill’... Since evidence of chill would be 
relevant to the plaintiffs’ claim that defendants’ activities did in fact 
                                                     
61 Laird v Tatum 408 US 1 (Supreme Court, 1972) particularly at 11-15. 
62 Meese v Keene 481 US 465 (Supreme Court, 1987) at 472-474.  
63 Yoggerst v  Stewart 623 F 2d 35 (7th Circuit, 1980). 
64 Above n 62, at 476. 
65 Morrison v Board of Education of Boyd County 521 F 3d 602 (6th Circuit, 2008) at 
608-610. 
66 Above n 62, at 479. 
67 635 F 2nd 216 (3rd Circuit, 1980). 
68 Ibid, at 225. 
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result in an unconstitutional restraint on protected speech and conduct, 
the District Court erred in excluding the plaintiffs’ proffered 
evidence”. 
 
The Court further held that the District Court had also: 
 
“...overlooked the fact that those letters contained language sometimes 
explicitly and other times implicitly threatening discipline up to 
dismissal if plaintiffs continued to engage in speech or other protected 
activity such as picketing.  They therefore do not stand on the same 
level as letters written by adherents of opposing viewpoints on an 
internal dispute.  They were written by a state official in a position of 
authority with the power to impose discipline.  They are therefore 
state action which must be exercised in compliance with the mandate 
of the First Amendment and cannot be dismissed as merely part of an 
academic debate.”69 
 
It is also “axiomatic” that any system of prior restraint of expression 
comes to court bearing a “heavy presumption against its constitutional 
validity” since it seeks to exclude speech from the “marketplace of ideas.”70 
But even in the United States, it is well-recognised and established that 
the protection of the first Amendment does not extend to everything claimed 
to be “freedom of expression” or “academic freedom” under the First 
Amendment: 
 
So academic freedom is not a “licence for uncontrolled expression at 
variance with established curricular contents and internally destructive 
of the functioning of the institution.”71  
 
and 
 
Generally conduct that involves “substantial disorder or invasion of 
the rights of others is not immunised by the guarantee under the First 
Amendment.”72 
 
Academic freedom is not absolute and may also be balanced against 
competing interests, including those of the government.  It has been 
                                                     
69 Ibid, at 228. 
70 Alderman v The Philadelphia Housing Authority 496 F 2d 164 (3rd Circuit 1974) at 
168 -170 citing numerous authorities.  
71 Clark v Holmes (1972) 474 F 2d 928 (7th Circuit 1972) at 931. 
72 Tinker v Des Moines 393 US 503 (Supreme Court 1969) at 513.  
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suggested, with reference to Keyishian and Sweezy, that in such 
circumstances, the interests have to be strong, and the extent of intrusion 
carefully limited.73 
One area where a balancing act is required is in relation to the freedom of 
a state employee to speak.  In such a case, there is little to support the 
imposition of a restraint on all the speech of public employees, even 
concerning a particular topic74 and Government workers are constitutionally 
protected from dismissal for publicly or privately criticising their employer’s 
policies on matters of public concern.  In this context academic freedom 
balances the  
 
“interests of the employee as a citizen in commenting on matters of 
public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in 
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its 
employers.” 
 
Such cases therefore call for a fact-sensitive and sophisticated weighing of 
competing values.75 
Certain legitimate interests of the State may limit a teacher’s right to say 
what he pleases, for example: the need to maintain discipline or harmony 
among co-workers; the need for confidentiality; the need to curtail conduct 
which impedes the teacher’s proper and competent performance of his daily 
duties; and the need to encourage a close and personal relationship between 
the employee and his superiors, where that relationship calls for loyalty and 
confidence.76 
Traditionally, Academic Freedom and freedom of expression can only be 
relied on where the communication in relation to which the claim is brought is 
made qua citizen and on a matter of public concern.77 
However, the Supreme Court recently held in a 5-4 judgment78 that 
Government employees who make statements of public concern outside the 
course of performing official duties retain some possibility of First 
Amendment protection; whereas the same employees who make statements 
pursuant to their official duties, are not speaking as citizens for First 
                                                     
73 Dow Chemical Company v Allen, 672 F 2d 1262 (7th Circuit 1982) at 1274-1276.  
74 Above n 70, at 174.  
75 Pickering v Board of Education of Township High School District 205, Will City 
391 US 563 (Supreme Court, 1968) at 566-574; Board of County Commissioners, 
Wabaunsee County v Keen A Umbehr 518 US 668 (Supreme Court, 1996) at 672, 
676. 
76 Above n 71, at 931 citing Pickering. 
77 Above n 75, at 568. 
78 Garcetti v Ceballos 547 US 410 (Supreme Court, 2006). 
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Amendment purposes and can be disciplined (if necessary) for articulation of 
such views. 
Furthermore, the Court took pains to clarify that the analysis would not 
necessarily apply in the same manner to a case which, unlike the one before it 
did not involve speech related to scholarship or teaching.”79 
So there is a difference between an academic qua academic and an 
academic qua citizen. 
Furthermore, such statements or criticism, if false, will not be protected if 
there is proof that they were knowingly or recklessly made.80 The First 
Amendment does not clothe a person with immunity vis à vis statements are 
shown to be false and inaccurate and whose truth could be easily 
ascertained.81 
The exceptions to this rule of silence on academic freedom where 
Constitutions are concerned are the German Constitution in which freedom of 
research and teaching is guaranteed by a separate clause of the freedom of 
expression provision82 and the South African Constitution which provides 
that: 
 
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which includes - 
(a) Freedom of the press and other media; 
(b) Freedom to receive or impart information or ideas; 
(c) Freedom of artistic creativity; and 
(d) Academic freedom and freedom of scientific research.' 
 
New Zealand has, like the United Kingdom, embedded academic freedom 
in a non-constitutional statute ie the Education Act 1989.83 
                                                     
79 Ibid, at 424-425. 
80 Above n 71, at 1738 (although it seems the comment was obiter). 
81 Megill v Board of Regents of the State of Florida, 541 F 2d 1073 (5th Circuit 1976) 
at 1085-1086. 
82 Article 5(3). 
83  S 160 Education Act 1989 is the objects clause of the relevant part and provides 
as follows: 
“Object: The object of the provisions of this Act relating to institutions 
[which includes universities] is to give them as much independence and 
freedom to make academic, operational, and management decisions as is 
consistent with the nature of the services they provide, the efficient use of 
national resources, the national interest, and the demands of accountability” 
(emphasis added) 
Ss 161 Education Act 1989 provides as follows: 
“Academic Freedom – 
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Judicial review of a suspension of statutory processes relating to Unitec (a 
polytechnic’s) application to be reconstituted as a university under s 162 of 
the Education Act 198984 went on appeal.  The Court of Appeal 85 held that: 
 
“[63] We see ss 160 and 161 as fulfilling two primary roles.  First, 
they are a parliamentary admonition to ministers and others on the 
importance of academic freedom and the need for public tertiary 
institutions to have autonomy (see, in that regards, s 161(4)).  
Secondly, they tell institutions how they are to act (see s 161(3)).  In 
that regard, the sections stand with ss 180 and 181 (which address the 
functions and duties of councils of institutions).  We also accept that 
ss 160 and 161 may be important when the disestablishment of an 
institution is contemplated.” 
 
There was, however, no discussion of the academic freedom whose 
importance they recognised.   
                                                                                                                               
(1) It is declared to be the intention of Parliament in enacting the provisions of 
this Act relating to instructions that academic freedom and the autonomy of 
institutions are to be preserved and enhanced. 
(2) For the purposes of this section, academic freedom, in relation to an 
institution, means – 
(a)The freedom of academic staff and students, within the law, to questions and 
test received wisdom, to put forward new ideas and to state controversial or 
unpopular opinions: 
(b)The freedom of academic staff and students to engage in research: 
(c)The freedom of the institution and its staff to regulate the subject-matter of 
courses taught at the institution: 
(d)The freedom of the institution and its staff to teach and assess students in the 
manner they consider best promotes learning: 
(e)The freedom of the institution through its chief executive to appoint its own 
staff. 
(3) In exercising their academic freedom and autonomy, institutions shall act in a 
manner that is consistent with – 
(a) The need for the maintenance by institutions of the highest ethical standards 
and the need to permit public scrutiny to ensure the maintenance of those 
standards; and 
(b) The need for accountability by institutions and the proper use by institutions 
of resources allocated to them. 
(4) In the performance of their functions the Councils and chief executives of 
institutions, Ministers, and authorities and agencies of the Crown shall act in all 
respects so as to give effect to the intention of Parliament as expressed in this 
section.83” (emphasis added) 
84 United Institute of Technology v Attorney-General [2006] 1 NZLR 65. 
85 Attorney-General v United Institute of Technology [2007] 1 NZLR 750. 
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Finally in an unreported decision Denis Asher of the Employment 
Relations Authority, Lally v The Vice Chancellor Victoria University of 
Wellington WA,86 seems to have adopted the Respondent’s contention that 
“...consistent with s 161 of the Education Act 1989, in general academic 
freedom is primarily exercised within the sphere of expertise of academic 
staff ... and involves a corresponding responsibility and is not to be interpreted 
as equivalent to an uninhibited licence”87 – in that instance the broadcasting to 
outsiders of concerns about the University’s disciplinary process. 
While under Article 34 of the Basic Law in Hong Kong all persons have 
the “freedom to engage in academic research, literary and artistic creation and 
other cultural activities”, the phrase “academic freedom” does not appear in 
Chapter III of the Basic Law which lists the fundamental rights of Hong Kong 
residents. 
Those majority jurisdictions which do not recognise academic freedom as 
being an autonomous, or fully self-contained freedom, see it rather as a 
constituent part of the broader right to freedom of expression.88  This has 
obvious implications from the perspective of the law.   
First in every jurisdiction – even, I repeat the USA – freedom of 
expression is qualified.  The European Convention on Human Rights 
(“ECHR”) Article 10 (now part of the fabric of our domestic law by 
reason of the Human Rights Act 1988 (“HRA”): allows for restrictions 
“prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society”.  In support of 
interests, including “for protection of the reputation or rights of others and 
for preventing disclosure of information received in confidence.” Second, 
academics have no special right to legal protection. 
                                                     
86 WA 140/06 5030767 (October 18th 2006). 
87 At [33], citing also Rigg v University of Waikato [1984] NZLR 149. 
88 The Commission made reference to three US decisions concerning the ambit of 
freedom of expression. 
 (1) Baumgartner v United States (1944) 322 US 665, concerning a citizen’s 
right to criticise civil servants and public policy: Report 14.8 (p 93). 
 (2) Lewis v Harrison School District No.1 (1986) 805 F (2d) 310 (8th Circuit), 
concerning the protection of free speech by an academic even where it is 
bluntly worded and directed at specific government officials: Report 14.9 (p 
93). 
 (3) New York Times Co v Sullivan (1964) 376 US 254, confirming the right to 
free speech under the US Constitution does not turn on the truth, popularity, 
or social utility of the ideas and beliefs offered: Report §14.12 (p 94). 
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The US jurisprudence demonstrates, as I have already shown, that 
academic freedom is not per se a fundamental right for individuals in its US 
constitutional context.89   
There are other examples from elsewhere which make the same point.  Mr 
Riggs was a Senior Lecturer in the University at Waikato who had co-
authored an article in the student newspaper alleging that inadequate 
supervision of the University’s biology isotope laboratory had probably 
resulted in students dying of cancer: that this had been covered up: and 
contained a challenging line “students are evidently dispensable”. There 
being, as it turned out, no basis for his allegations, his contract was 
terminated.  
The Visitor said in Riggs v University of Waikato: 
 
“...we are unable to accept the notion, as propounded to us by Mr 
Rigg, that there is some kind of freedom of expression, relevant to the 
present case, which cannot be correctly defined as academic freedom 
of expression in the strict sense yet is enjoyed by academics when 
speaking in their capacity 'as members of the university community' or 
'citizens of the university' and is greater than any freedom of 
expression enjoyed by ordinary citizens in ordinary life.” 90 
  
"The only justification which we can see for a special right to freedom 
of expression in a university environment is the need for academics, 
whether teachers or students, to feel free to pursue the search for 
knowledge and learning and truth without fear of institutional 
disciplinary action being used to divert them from these purposes in 
order to force conformity with views held by the university authority." 
 
And the Court in the Hong Kong case which I cited at the outset expressed 
its conclusions in the same way. 
 
“Whatever the perception may be, academics today are not cloistered 
in ivory towers divorced from the realities of the world. To the 
contrary, academics work in association with both the private sector 
and the public in all areas of advancement. This applies not only in 
respect of scientific and technological innovation but in areas of law 
reform, social welfare and the like. Academia, with its intellectual 
                                                     
89 Keyishian v Board of Regents 385 US 589 (Supreme Court, 1967); Schrier v 
University of Colorado 427 F.3d 1253 (10th Circuit, 2005) at 1265-1266 and see 
above n 71.  
90  Above n 87, at 207. 
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rigour, also plays an important role in analysing and, if necessary, 
criticising the nature and effectiveness of public policies and 
measures. 
To misunderstand the Commission (which came to its findings 
within the context of very particular facts) and to suggest that senior 
public administrators and academics should never be able to privately 
engage in robust debate over matters of opinion and policy, the one 
criticising the other, is, in our view, not only artificial and stultifying, 
it has no basis in law. We do not see that it would be improper for a 
senior official to privately engage an academic in order to state 
Government's views, even to the extent of arguing that the academic 
should in the result change his or her views. That is all part of the ebb 
and flow of free debate. 
Accordingly, the fact that a senior public administrator privately 
confronts an academic to criticise that academic's published opinions 
on any particular matter does not itself constitute a violation of Art 
137 or the academic's own right to freedom of expression.  It only 
does so when the confrontation contains, directly or by implication, a 
threat of sanction of the kind we have described earlier in this 
judgment. That, as we see it, is the position in law.”91 
 
Nor is Academic Freedom given any special status in international law.  It 
is obliquely vouched for, not in International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (“ICCPR”) but in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR”) both of which were adopted by the United 
Nations in 1966) and came into force in 1976.92  
Article 13 which recognises the right of everyone to education, is in itself 
silent on academic freedom but has been the subject of commentary by the 
United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in UN 
Committee on ESCR, General Comment No.13 (1999) [as noted in the Hong 
Kong Catholic Schools case], which suggests that academic freedom is 
inherent in the very concept of the right to education, and itself cross-refers to 
the UNESCO Recommendation Concerning the Status of Higher-Education 
Teaching Personnel (1997).93 
                                                     
91 Above n 1, at [75-76]. 
92 In 1976, the Government of the United Kingdom ratified the two covenants in 
respect of the United Kingdom and its dependent territories. 
93 Adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO at its 26th Plenary Meeting on  
November 11th 1997. 
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So in the context of international law academic freedom is relegated to a 
footnote in a comment! 94 These instruments are in large part hortatory and 
aspirational but there is a telling phrase in the Comment that academics must 
not be exposed to fear of repression by the state “or any other actor”.95 
In 2008 I was (with a colleague at Blackstone Chambers) asked to advise 
the legal implications of a motion to be debated (as indeed it was) at the 
annual National Congress of the University and College Union on May 28 – 
30th 2008.   
The Motion having expressed, by way of preface, a strong critique of 
Israel’s policies on the West Bank and Gala invited Congress to resolve that, 
amongst other matters: 
 
• Colleagues be asked to consider the moral and political implications of 
educational links with Israeli institutions, and to discuss the occupation 
with individuals and institutions concerned, including Israeli 
colleagues with whom they are collaborating; 
• The Ariel College, an explicitly colonising institution in the West 
Bank, be investigated under the formal Greylisting Procedure.96 
 
We advised that the resolutions, if acted on, would offend against various 
provisions of outlawing racial discrimination legislation but was also outside 
the Union’s constitutional powers. 
We noted that under Rule 2.1 of the Rules the primary aims and objects of 
the Union are to “…promote the professional interests of members 
individually and collectively…”; and under Rule 2.2 a further aim and object 
is to “promote Adult, Further and Higher Education and research”.  We noted 
the Union had also committed itself on its website to the principle of 
academic freedom and the need to resist attempts to erode academic freedom. 
Against this background, we did not see how it could be consistent with the 
Union’s Rules to pass a resolution mandating certain actions by its members 
including potential severance of links with other academic institutions.  Such 
quasi-boycott, in our view, did nothing to promote the interests of members at 
professional level or to promote academic freedom.  Indeed it pointed in the 
opposite direction. As a result of our opinion, the Union retracted and 
                                                     
94 See too The Lima Declaration on Academic Freedom and Autonomy of Institutions 
of Higher Education, which recalls, in its Preamble, the extensive set of international 
standards in, amongst other things, the ICESCR and makes various proclamations on 
academic freedom and autonomy of institutions of higher education. Proclaimed in 
Lima by the 68th General Assembly of World University Service on September 10th 
1988. 
95 Para 38. 
96 Grey listing being a precursor to black listing. 
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retreated. 
I have spoken so far of rights of university teachers.  But rights of free 
expression are for students as well as staff.  In the USA it has been held that 
Universities infringe free speech rights if they attempt to control content of 
student journals97 or to discriminate in support student societies on grounds of 
society’s beliefs.98 In South Africa 1987 regulations which required 
universities to take steps directed towards the prevention and punishment of 
student political activity were set aside on grounds of vagueness.99 So 
academic freedom is expressly protected, albeit again as a subset of freedom 
of belief and opinion.   
This applies not only to what students can say, but whom they must hear.  
The Education Act (No.2) (1986) s.43(1) imposes an obligation on 
universities and colleges of further and higher education100 to take steps that 
“are reasonably practicable to ensure that freedom of speech within the law is 
secured for members, students and employees of the establishment and for 
visiting speakers”.101    
This affects gown, but not town.  It has been held that the risk of disorder 
outside university premise is not a ground for refusing permission to a visiting 
speaker,102 where the controversial invitee to the Liverpool University 
Conservative Association was a South African diplomat of the era of 
apartheid.   
Let me return last to the Malaysian case Merdeka University Berhad.103  
The majority considered – counter-intuitively - that a private university would 
nonetheless be a public authority for the purpose of that provision, but also 
observed that universities were: 
  
“…an instrument for bringing about one nation out of the disparative 
ethnic elements in our population.”104  
 
The minority noted too in his coda  
 
                                                     
97 Hosty v Carter 325 US F 30 945 (7th Circuit 2003).  
98 Rosenberger v University of Virginia (1995) 515 US 819.  
99University of Cape Town v Ministers of Education and Culture: (House of 
Assembly and House of Representatives [1988] 3 SA 203.  
100 But not in other fora eg town hall (outside the context of elections) s 43 (2). 
Barendt op cit fn 4 supra p.501 
101 See C.R. Evans “Campus Speech Codes” Education Law Journal 2010 Vol 11 
Issue 2 p.95 
102 R v Liverpool University ex p [1991] 1 QB 124.   
103 Above n 23.  
104 Ibid, at 252.  
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
 
 
141 
 
“…it is not out of place to state that the activities of modern 
universities embrace a wider scope than mere teaching. When 
sufficiently financed, research and experimental work of great value to 
the public and nation is constantly being carried out in them.”105  
 
The majority observation was more eloquently stated than the minority 
one: but both said something of extreme importance about the place of 
universities in a nation’s life.   
In particular in England which is now, like Malaysia a multicultural 
country – albeit with radically different proportions and indeed characteristics 
of the constituent ethnic groups – universities, the intellectual finishing 
schools of the best and brightest of the population, provide a unique 
opportunity for sharing the fruits of different background and collaborating in 
the genesis of shared values.   This may not be itself an aspect of academic 
freedom, but that opportunity would be much diminished if academic freedom 
did not exist.  And, even if the spirit of inquiry ought not to be cribbed and 
confined, by a need to produce work of strictly practical benefit, there is little 
doubt that, as the minority Merdeka judge observed, whether by design or 
accident, such work is generated: and, even where it is not, the study of 
philosophy, literature and history - both process and product – are essential to 
the maintenance of a civilised society.   
Academic freedom, whether the perquisite of institution or of individual, 
but as I would prefer to say, of both, underpins those benefits.  Next time 
there is an attempt to redefine in legal forms our fundamental rights and 
freedoms – and the Conservative party promised, if elected to introduce a 
British Bill of Rights106 – it should not be overlooked. 
                                                     
105 Ibid, at 255.   
106 Something that may not be highest on the agenda of the Coalition government. 
